Sydney Grammar School - Philosophy Club

Morality and Third World Poverty

Introduction

Some facts:

Approximately 20% of the world's population live in absolute poverty.
Absolute poverty = malnutrition, low life expectancy, disease, inadequate housing, lack of clean drinking water, unemployment and underemployment, high rate of infant mortality, inadequate education, high levels of illiteracy.
Huge inequalities: Average income of poorest 2.8 billion people is about $330 per year; average income of richest 850 million is about $20 000 per year. Richest 16% of world's population earn about 78% of its income.

Question: Should people in more affluent countries help those people living in absolute poverty in poor countries?

Peter Singer's Argument

If we can prevent something bad without sacrificing anything of comparable significance, then we ought to do it.
Absolute poverty is bad.
There is some absolute poverty we can prevent without sacrificing anything of comparable significance.

Conclusion: We ought to prevent some absolute poverty.

The first premise is the crucial one. For if it is true then the conclusion is unavoidable. Singer's conclusion is that there is a moral obligation to assist people in absolute poverty. It is not just that it would be kind or generous of us to assist. We are morally required to assist. Singer's point is that "ought to prevent absolute poverty" is like "ought to keep your promises". Kindness and generosity are to be encouraged but they are not obligatory. In contrast, promise keeping is obligatory. So, morally speaking, it is morally obligatory to prevent some absolute poverty. Or at least that's what Singer is arguing.

Some questions about the argument:

Is there an obligation to assist? What exactly is an obligation? Is there a duty? What's the difference? Is there a right to receive assistance?
If the first premise were true then would we be faced with an endless series of obligations to assist? How many bad things do we have to prevent? Is one enough? How often do we have to prevent bad things? Do we have to go looking for bad things to prevent?
Empirical issue: Don't we already give part of our income in the form of foreign aid? Why should we give more?
Maybe because foreign is not enough. The United Nations target for foreign aid is 0.7% of GDP, but the average for OECD countries is about 0.3%; Scandinavian countries are the exception.
Why donate to foreign countries when there is poverty at home? Why not donate to poor people or other people and institutions in need in one's own country? For example: Salvation Army, Associations for the blind and for the paraplegic, hospitals, Red Cross, cancer research, and so on.

Two related dilemmas (Peter Unger)

The Vintage Sedan: You have a vintage Mercedes sedan (though you're not rich) and you've restored it to mint condition at great expense, especially the leather seating. You're driving in the country and come across a man (a hiker) with a badly injured foot. Although his life is not at risk, if you don't get him to hospital quickly he will lose his foot. If you take him in your car the blood from his foot will soak into the leather upholstery and will cost about $2000 to restore. There's no one else around to help. What should you do?
The Envelope: You receive mail from Care Australia requesting donations of $100, say, to combat water-borne diseases in African children. If you don't send the money then 20 children, who otherwise would have lived, will die. What should you do?

According to Unger it is clear that you ought to save the hiker's foot. But if so, then in (2) isn't it just as clear that you ought to send the $100? Are there any morally relevant differences between (1) and (2)?

Here's a list of suggested differences:

Physical distance: The children are much further away.
Social distance: The hiker is a compatriot but the children are not.
Direct perception: You perceive the suffering more directly in the case of the hiker than in the case of the children.
Unique potential: You are the only person who can help the hiker, but if you don't send the $100 other people might.
Emergency: The hiker's case is an emergency but the children's case is (slightly) less immediate.
Particular person: In the case of the hiker it is clear exactly who you are helping, but this is not so for the children.
Particular knowledge: For the hiker you know who you are helping, but this is not so for the children.
Effective help: The help you provide for the hiker is effective, but you don't know that when helping the children.
Single community: Duty of mutual aid set against a background of a community of people many of whom recognize a duty to help.

Do you think that these differences are significant? If you should help the hiker then is it also the case that you should help the children?

Some further Issues and questions

Whether or not Singer and Unger have established an obligation to assist, there are other issues. For what if the actions and policies of the rich countries are actually making life worse for the poor nations? Consider some examples.

The debt crisis: Dates back to the early 1970's when Western banks had vast sums of money from OPEC nations as a result of the 1973 oil crisis. Banks aggressively pursued loans to poor countries in Africa and South and Central America. As interest rates increased the debtor nations were faced with huge interest repayments.

Between 1982 and 1990 debtor nations repaid over $1.3 trillion in interest and in that time the net transfer of money from poor to rich countries was about $165 billion. Currently the debtor countries in Africa pay twice as much per person in debt repayments ($22) as they do per person on health care. During 1999 the total amount from debt repayments was about $270 billion.
Unfair terms of trade: Protectionist policies in rich countries, especially in textiles and agriculture, cost the poor countries an estimated $700 billion in lost trade. Government subsidies to farming in USA and Europe lowers prices of agricultural products forming the basis of exports by poor countries, especially in Africa.

Questions:

Are rich countries morally obliged to (i) provide debt relief, (ii) cancel the debt, (iii) ensure fair terms of trade?
Compare the issues raised by Singer and Unger: They argued for an obligation to help, whereas here the issue is one of not causing harm. Is the obligation not to cause harm stronger than the obligation to assist? In general, are negative obligations and duties (not to harm) stronger than positive obligations and duties (to assist)?

References:

S. George, A Fate Worse than Debt. (Video in SGS library)
P. Singer, Practical Ethics, Ch. 8 (In SGS library)
P. Unger, Living High and Letting Die.

Philosophy Club