Philosophy Club

The Problem of Evil

Introduction

Theists believe that God is, amongst other things, infinitely powerful (“omnipotent”) and infinitely good (“omnibenevolent”). For instance, in both the Judaic-Christian and Islamic traditions part of what it is to believe in the existence of God is that he be both omnipotent and omnibenevolent. Any being which lacked either or both of these attributes could not be God. The most serious philosophical threat to the belief in an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God arises out of what is called the “problem of evil”. It can be expressed in the following way.

1. If God is omnipotent then he is able to eliminate evil.
2. If God is omnibenevolent then he wants to eliminate evil.
3. Evil exists (i.e. it has not been eliminated).
4. Therefore God is either not omnipotent or he is not omnibenevolent.

From what has been said above, if the conclusion (4) is true then God does not exist. This is the problem of evil. I am going to outline and examine some attempts by theists to solve this problem.

Some attempts to solve the problem

Before discussing the main attempts at solving the problem of evil a distinction must be made between human evil and natural evil. Human evils arise out of the actions performed by human beings and consist of such things as murder, torture, rape, war and so on. Natural evils arise out of natural occurrences which result in human suffering and misery and consist of such things as earthquakes, floods, cyclones and so on. This distinction will bear on the discussion of the problem of evil.

1. The contrast argument: A world which contains good must also contain evil. Evil is a necessary counterpart to good. In a similar way, sadness is a necessary counterpart to happiness - there couldn't be one without the other. And since goodness can't exist without evil, God could not eliminate evil without also eliminating goodness. Expecting God to eliminate evil while retaining goodness is like expecting God to eliminate shape while retaining size. The very concepts of good and evil are connected in such a way that they must stand or fall together, and hence it is not a limitation of God's power that he can't retain one without the other.
   
   There are two comments that can be made about the contrast argument.
   
   Firstly, even if it is plausible to say that in general goodness requires evil, this applies only to the concepts of good and evil. It may be true that we can't have the concept of goodness without having the concept of evil. However it doesn't follow that evil must actually exist. We can have concepts of things which don't exist such as unicorns and mermaids. To make the required contrast it is enough that we be able to conceive evil - it is not necessary that evil actually exist.
   
   Secondly, suppose that some evil must actually exist in order to maintain the required contrast between good and evil. Surely only a small amount of evil would do. The contrast argument does not explain why there is so much evil. Think, for instance, of the untold misery caused by war.
   
   The contrast argument seems unsatisfactory.
   
   
2. The free will defence: This attempt to solve the problem of evil is concerned specifically with human evil. The reasoning goes like this: God created human beings and gave them free will, by virtue of which they have the ability to choose freely between good and evil. Thus it is this power of free choice which produces human evils such as war and murder. The central point is that even an omnipotent God cannot control or direct the actions of free agents, for that would be contradictory. So according to the free will defence, the existence of human evil is perfectly consistent with the existence of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God.
   
   Consider firstly, why couldn't God have created us so that we have no inclination to do evil? There are many things which I am free to do but have not the slightest inclination to do - for example, count the trees in Centennial Park or get up at 3 am every morning and eat a banana. Couldn't God have arranged things so that although we were free to do evil we never actually did so, or at least very rarely did so? But maybe if God had arranged things like that we would not have been truly free. So consider a second point. Couldn't God intervene to prevent evil in such a way as not to undermine our free will? Here's an example:
   
   Terrorists plant a bomb on a passenger plane and plan to detonate the bomb by remote control. Couldn't God intervene to prevent the detonation device working? The terrorists acted perfectly freely, we suppose, but God would intervene to prevent the consequences of their free choice. In this way there could be free will without all the associated misery. In the same way God could intervene to prevent bullets hitting their targets, missiles exploding and also prevent the countless other harmful consequences of the evil choices and decisions which were freely made. Thus there seems to be no reason why God couldn't have created free human beings while at the same time ensuring that the worst effects of their freedom be avoided. Free will cannot explain away the existence of evil.
   
   Notice that in any case the free will defence applied only to human evil and not to natural evil. A different sort of argument is needed to account for the problem of natural evil.
   
   
3. Evil required for “soul-making”: The English Christian philosopher John Hick has attempted to account for the existence of evil - both human and natural - by introducing the idea of “soul-making”. Hick begins with the claim that the world has a divine purpose. God's purpose, according to Hick, was to create a world where free beings “develop the moral qualities of human personality” in the face of challenges,hardships and obstacles presented both by the natural environment and by the actions of other people. So in the face of the natural evils (droughts, earthquakes, etc.) and human evils (murder, torture, etc.), by struggling against these adversities people will hopefully develop such moral qualities as courage, fortitude, generosity, resilience, kindness, wisdom, sense of justice and so on. This is “soul-making”. Crucial to Hick's argument is that the existence of evil is essential for the divine purpose. A world without pain, suffering, frustration, danger and misery - without evil, in other words - would be totally unsuited for soul making. The point is that God needs the existence of evil in order to fulfil his purpose in creating the world. Thus the existence of evil is compatible with the existence of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God.
   
   Notice that if Hick is right then we can answer the question raised earlier when discussing the free will defence. The reason God doesn't intervene to prevent bombs exploding or to prevent earthquakes is that he doesn't want to prevent them. The divine purpose, as Hick presents it, was to create a giant obstacle course to test and develop the moral fibre of human beings with the power of free choice. Good people triumph over evil and are rewarded in the after-life; bad people succumb and suffer eternal punishment.
   
   What are we to make of Hick's attempt? Suppose we leave aside the question as to how Hick would know what the divine purpose is, or indeed as to whether there is one. There is another worry. A moral testing ground suitable for soul making should, if perfectly designed, give everyone an equal chance. However evil is very unequally distributed. For example, over a billion people in the Third World suffer disproportionately from drought, famine and disease. Thus large numbers of humans get very little chance at soul making. In particular the several million children who die in infancy each year get no chance at all. An omnipotent and omnibenevolent God should be able to do better. But isn't the unequal distribution of evil the result of human free will and so not up to God? This does not seem to be true of the natural evils. Natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes do not affect all people equally. The moral testing ground does not give everyone an equal chance at soul-making.

Some questions

1. Soul-making comes at a great cost as there is an enormous amount of evil in the world. Is it worth the cost? Would an omnibenevolent God subject human beings to such a harsh testing ground?
2. Would a world without evil be a better world than one containing evil? Could God bring it about that though some evil exists, there is much less of it?

References

J. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism
J. Hick, Philosophy of Religion

R.Neurath