The Emotive Theory of Ethics
Introduction
The emotive theory of ethics is a theory in “meta-ethics”. Meta-ethics is that part of ethical theory which considers the meaning of ethical terms such as “right”, “wrong”, obligation”, “duty”, “good” ,”bad”. As well as this, meta-ethics tries to answer questions such as “Are there moral facts?”, “Is there such a thing as moral truth?”, “Is moral reasoning part of normal rational inference or is it something entirely different?” Meta-ethics is contrasted with what is called “normative ethics”. Normative ethics involves such questions as “Can it ever be morally right to tell a lie?, “Is killing ever morally justifiable?”, “Is human happiness the ultimate good?” Roughly speaking, normative ethics involves questions about what is right or wrong, good or bad, about what we are obliged to do, what we have a duty to do, about our rights, and so on. When we think about or discuss moral issues it is usually normative ethics. Meta-ethics is a more abstract, philosophical investigation into the nature of normative ethics.
Why bother with meta-ethics? Isn't normative ethics enough? One reason for bothering with meta-ethics, and one that is relevant to the emotive theory, concerns the foundations of ethics itself. It is a matter of answering the following questions: What are moral judgements about? Do they describe a certain type of fact – moral facts? Thus, if say that it is wrong to break promises, then does this mean that I am describing a moral fact about the wrongness of breaking promises? Does the world contain moral facts as well as the more familiar physical facts about Sydney being north of Melbourne or the boiling point of water being 100 degrees Centigrade? These questions go to the heart of the nature of ethics. We believe that ethical judgements can be correct or incorrect or that there is such a thing as getting the right answer to moral questions. That is to say that we believe moral judgements to have a certain degree of objectivity. The meta-ethical question is whether or not this belief is justified. To say that moral judgements are objective seems to involve the idea that they are about something – moral facts. If a moral judgement is objective then it seems to be in some sense descriptive. In other words, according to this view moral judgements are descriptive, and what they describe is a set of moral facts. We need to justify these beliefs in order to provide ethics with a secure foundation. Without this we can never be sure that ethics is more than just a matter of opinion – even worse, where one opinion is as good as any other.
The Emotive Theory of Ethics
The emotive theory of ethics denies that moral judgements are descriptive. According to the emotive theory, a moral judgement is nothing more than an expression of attitudes of approval or disapproval. For example, if you make the moral judgement that tax evasion is wrong then you are simply expressing your disapproval of tax evasion. And if you judge that one ought to give to famine relief then you are expressing your approval towards giving to famine relief. And, furthermore, if the emotive theory is right, then expressing approval or disapproval is all you are doing. The emotive theory asserts that moral judgements are in no way descriptive. They are no more descriptive than “Aaaah!” or “Go the Magpies!” Moreover, since moral judgements are not descriptive they are neither true nor false. The emotive theory rejects ethical truth as well as ethical fact. An expression of approval or disapproval can no more be true or false than an expression of pain or joy. Expressions such as “Great!”, “Fantastic!” or “Ouch!” have no truth value.
Notice what the emotive theory does not assert. It is not stating that, for example, when you judge that tax evasion is wrong or that donating to famine relief is right you are talking about or describing your attitude of disapproval or approval. In saying that tax evasion is wrong you are expressing rather than describing your disapproval. This is like screaming “Aaaah!” when you knock your funny-bone – your scream is an expression of pain rather than a description of the pain such as “That was agonising!” As stated above, a description can be true or false but an expression cannot.
What is the advantage of the emotive theory? One advantage is that we don't have to give an account of moral facts. What exactly are moral facts? How exactly do we apprehend them? Do we need a special faculty of moral intuition? If we adopt the emotive theory then none of these questions arise. For according to the emotive theory, moral judgements - judgements about what is right or wrong, good or evil, about duties, rights, obligations, virtues, vices and so on - are not descriptions at all. And therefore there is, according to the emotive theory, no separate realm of moral fact which moral judgements are describing. According to the theory there is no more to making a moral judgement than expressing approval or disapproval. Another advantage is that it explains why some moral disagreements are almost impossible to resolve. If, as the emotive theory states, moral disagreements are ultimately about attitudes of approval and disapproval then these disagreements can't be settled by rational argument. It is then no wonder that moral disputes about issues like abortion, euthanasia and capital punishment seem to go on for ever. They are not factual disputes at all and so can't be resolved by appeals to evidence, observation and rational argument.
Some questions
Can we accept the emotive theory's claim that there is no moral truth? Isn't it obviously true to say that genocide or gang rape are morally abhorrent? If a consequence of the emotive theory is that, for example, “Genocide is a great moral evil” is not true (or false), then why should we believe the theory? Perhaps, but what exactly is moral truth? If there is moral truth then must there also be moral facts? And if there are moral facts does that mean that the world contains strange things such as obligations, duties and rights, and weird stuff such has good and evil, right and wrong?
The emotive theory states that if you say that something is good or right is simply for you to express your approval. But these terms are not always used in this way. For example, I might say “If abortion is morally wrong because it involves the taking of innocent life, then you war is also morally wrong because it too involves the taking of innocent life”. Here I am not asserting that abortion is morally wrong but only saying that if it is then …. In other words I am not using “morally wrong” to express my disapproval, contrary to the emotive theory. Therefore it is not the case that all uses of moral terms are for expressing approval or disapproval. How might the emotive theorist reply to this?
As mentioned above, one of the advantages of the emotive theory is that it dispenses with moral facts thus avoiding the related philosophical problems. But are moral facts really so difficult to understand? Are they more difficult to understand than, say, legal facts? Consider “Car theft is illegal”. Does the truth of this statement require the existence of legal facts? Are legal facts mysterious? Why not say that legal facts can be understood in terms of the existence of acts of parliament, judicial decisions, written down laws, and so on? Moral facts can similarly be understood in terms of community behaviour, moral codes and so on. Thus, legal facts are not mysterious as they are based on the existence of legal institutions. Then similarly, perhaps moral facts are not mysterious in this case being based on moral rather than legal institutions.
R. Neurath